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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(h) (1989), or Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(j) 
(1990). Jurisdiction in the Utah Supreme Court prior to transfer 
was proper under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Was the trial court's factual finding that appellee was 
not negligent against the clear weight of the evidence? 
Standard of review: A trial court's finding of fact will only 
be set aside by a reviewing court if it is against the clear weight 
of the evidence, or the reviewing court otherwise reaches a 
"definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Smith 
v. Linmar Energy Corp., 790 P.2d 1222, 124 (Utah App. 1990). A 
finding of fact is clearly erroneous "only if the finding is without 
adequate evidentiary support or is induced by an erroneous view of 
the law." Id. 
2. Did the trial court correctly determine, as an 
alternative ground, that appellant's cause of action arose out of 
an inherent risk of skiing, and was thus barred under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-27-53? 
Standard of review: The trial court's determination was 
interpretation of a statute in light of findings of fact. The 
1 
court's interpretation of the statute is reviewed for correctness. 
Western Fiberglass, Inc. v. Kirton, McConkie and Bushnell, 789 P.2d 
34, 37 (Utah App. 1990). The court's underlying finding of fact 
will be upheld unless clearly erroneous. Smith v. Linmar Energy 
Corp., 790 P.2d 1222, 1224 (Utah App. 1990). 
3. Did the trial court err in its award of costs to 
defendant? 
Standard of review: The lower court's award of costs is 
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Lloyd's Unlimited 
v. Nature's Way, 753 P.2d 507, 510 (Utah App. 1988). 
STATUTES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-11-37. Passenger tramways - Purpose and scope 
of act. 
In order to safeguard the life, health, property and 
welfare of the citizens of Utah while using passenger 
tramways, as defined in Section 63-11-38, it shall be 
the policy of the state to protect its citizens and 
visitors from unnecessary mechanical hazards in the 
design, construction and operation of passenger 
tramways, but not from the hazards inherent in the 
sports of mountaineering, skiing and hiking, or from the 
hazards of the area served by such passenger tramways, 
all of which hazards are assumed by the skier or other 
sportsman; and that periodic inspections be required of 
passenger tramways with a view to assuring that each one 
of them meets "The United States of America Standard 
Institute Safety Code for Aerial Passenger Tramways," 
or equivalent. The state, through the Passenger Tramway 
Safety Board, shall register all passenger tramways in 
the state, establish reasonable standards of design, 
construction and operational practices and cause to be 
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made such inspection as may be necessary in carrying 
this policy into effect• 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-51. Inherent risks of skiing - Public 
policy. 
The Legislature finds that the sport of skiing is 
practiced by a large number of residents of Utah and 
attracts a large number of nonresidents, significantly 
contributing to the economy of this state. It further 
finds that few insurance carriers are willing to provide 
liability insurance protection to ski area operators and 
that the premiums charged by those carriers have risen 
sharply in recent years due to confusion as to whether 
a skier assumes the risks inherent in the sport of 
skiing. It is the purpose of this act, therefore, to 
clarify the law in relation to skiing injuries and the 
risks inherent in that sport, to establish as a matter 
of law that certain risks are inherent in that sport, 
and to provide that, as a matter of public policy, no 
person engaged in that sport shall recover from a ski 
operator for injuries resulting from those inherent 
risks. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-52. Inherent risks of skiing - Definitions. 
As used in this act: 
(1) "Inherent risks of skiing" means those dangers or 
conditions which are an integral part of the sport of 
skiing, including, but not limited to: changing weather 
conditions, variations of steepness in terrain; snow or 
ice conditions; surface or subsurface conditions such 
as bare spots, forest growth, rocks, stumps, impact with 
lift towers and other structures and their components; 
collisions with other skiers; and a skier's failure to 
ski within his own ability. 
(2) "Injury" means any personal injury or property 
damage or loss. 
(3) "Skier" means any person present in a ski area for 
the purpose of engaging in the sport of skiing. 
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(4) "Ski area" means any area designated by a ski area 
operator to be used for skiing. 
(5) "Ski area operator" means those persons, and their 
agents, officers, employees or representatives, who 
operate a ski area. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-53. Inherent risks of skiing - Bar against 
claim or recovery from operator for injury from risks inherent in 
sport. 
Notwithstanding anything in §§ 78-27-37 through 78-27-
4 3 to the contrary, no skier may make any claim against, 
or recover from, any ski area operator for injury 
resulting from any of the inherent risks of skiing. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of The Case and Course of Proceedings 
This personal injury action arose out of an accident at 
Brighton Ski Resort in which appellant was struck by a ski lift 
chair. The action was tried to the bench on April 26-27, 1989. 
The trial court took the matter under advisement, and subsequently 
determined that the evidence showed that appellee, Brighton, did not 
breach any duty to appellant. 
As an alternative ground for finding no cause of action 
against Brighton, the trial court found that appellant's claims 
arose solely due to the negligence of other skiers, and were thus 
barred by the "inherent risks of skiing" statute, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-27-53. 
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The trial court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Judgment against appellant on June 2, 1989. The judgment 
included an award of costs to Brighton, in accordance with a 
memorandum of costs submitted by Brighton. 
Statement of Facts 
The appellant, Hale, was supervising a group of 14-year-old 
boys who were skiing at Brighton Ski Resort. (R.103 at 5, 15.) Two 
of the boys were immediately behind Hale in the lift line waiting 
to load onto the lift chairs. (R.103 at 111.) The ski lift 
transports skiers up the mountain in two-passenger lift chairs. 
Skiers preparing to load the lift wait behind a designated line 
until it is their turn to load. At that time, the skiers move 
forward into the loading area and await the arrival of the lift 
chair, which comes around a circular bullwheel and approaches from 
behind. 
On this occasion, the boys were not paying attention and/or 
became confused as to which lift chair they were supposed to take, 
and entered the loading area too early. (R.103 at 95-96, 108, 121, 
124, 315.) The lift operator knew that if the boys were not pushed 
back, the lift chair would hit the boys from the side and would then 
hit appellant. (R.103 at 150.) In this emergency situation, the 
operator made a split-second decision. He jumped and pushed the 
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boys out of the way, saving them from a dangerous side impact. 
(R.103 at 150, 198-90, 205.) The lift chair still grazed one of the 
boys. (Id.) The operator then hit the stop button and grabbed the 
chair, helping to stabilize it. (Id.) If the lift operator had hit 
the stop button first, both the boys and the appellant would still 
have been hit by the chair because the lift, by design, stops slowly 
in order not to eject the other lift passengers. (R.103 at 210, 266, 
244, 297.) 
The lift chair had begun swinging somewhat from its contact 
with the boy and/or the lift operator. However, lift chairs can be 
loaded without incident when swinging mildly if the person loading 
follows standard procedure, turning back toward the chair and 
grabbing the pole to steady the chair. (R.103 at 197.) The 
appellant, an experienced skier, knew that proper loading procedure 
was to turn and observe the approaching lift chair and grab the 
chair's pole to stabilize the chair as he loaded. (R.103 at 63.) 
In this instance, however, he failed to turn and look, and the chair 
hit him in the back of the leg. (R.103 at 49-50, 59.) 
There is some question as to whether another person was 
standing waiting to load with the appellant, but it is clear that 
if there was such a person, he or she loaded successfully or merely 
stepped aside and avoided any contact with the chair. (R.103 at 105-
106.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court's findings of fact were not against the 
great weight of the evidence, and should be affirmed. Appellant 
completely failed to marshal the evidence supporting the findings, 
and cited only isolated portions of testimony which do not conflict 
with the court's factual determinations. Substantial evidence was 
presented to show that Brighton acted reasonably in response to an 
emergency created by two other skiers, and did not breach any duty 
to appellant. 
2. As an alternative ground, the trial court's judgment was 
appropriate in that appellant's cause of action arose out of the 
negligence of other skiers, and was thus barred by the "inherent 
risks of skiing" statute, Utah Code Ann § 78-27-53. Injuries caused 
by the carelessness or recklessness of other skiers are an inherent 
risk of the sport, as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-53. 
Couching a claim in terms of negligence does not remove the claim 
from the coverage of the statute. 
3. The trial court properly awarded costs to Brighton. 
Appellant's failure to raise any specific objections to Brighton's 
memorandum of costs constituted a waiver of any such objections on 
appeal. Furthermore, Brighton's memorandum of costs was 
procedurally sufficient to support the award of costs. While the 
memorandum did not contain a jurat, it is undisputed that the 
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memorandum was duly sworn. A jurat is merely evidence that an oath 
was taken, not part of the oath, and therefore its absence does not 
invalidate a sworn document. 
The depositions of appellant, Jason Johnstone, Jerry 
Steinagel, Richcird Cummock and Dr. Gordon Kimball were reasonably 
necessary; consequently, the costs of those depositions were 
properly awarded. Brighton concedes that the expert fee paid to 
Newell Knight may not constitute a reimbursable cost, but submits 
that appellant has waived any objection to the award. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT APPELLEE DID NOT 
BREACH ANY DUTY TO PLAINTIFF IS SUPPORTED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE 
AFFIRMED. 
A. Plaintiff Has Failed to Marshal All The Evidence Supporting 
The Trial Court's Finding, Which Warrants Affirmance Of The 
Judgment. 
After a two-day bench trial, the trial court found that 
appellee Brighton was not negligent in its reaction to the boys1 
premature entry into the loading area. (R.88-89; see Addendum.) In 
his brief, appellant challenges the Court's factual findings, 
apparently contending that the findings were against the weight of 
the evidence. 
This court has held on several occasions that 
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[an appellant], in challenging the trial 
court's factual finding, must proceed in two 
steps: The [appellant] must first marshal all 
the evidence that supports the trial court's 
finding, and then demonstrate that, despite 
this evidence, the finding is so lacking in 
support as to be "against the clear weight of 
the evidence" and, thus, clearly erroneous. 
Smith v. Linmar Energy Corp., 790 P.2d 1222, 1224 (Utah App. 1990). 
When an appellant fails to so marshal the evidence, this Court will 
"refuse to consider the merits of challenges to the findings and 
accept the findings as valid." Saunders v. Sharp, 135 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 68, 70 (Utah App. 1990). See also Smith, supra, at 1225; 
Wright v. Westside Nursery, 787 P.2d 508, 514 (Utah App. 1990). 
In this case, as in Saunders, the appellant challenges the 
trial court's factual findings, but ignores the evidence which 
supports those findings. Appellant sets forth only the testimony 
which he claims supports his version of the accident. Appellant's 
approach is clearly contrary to the dictates of this court, and that 
alone warrants affirmance of the judgment. Because the trial 
court's other grounds for finding no cause of action against 
Brighton were expressly alternative grounds, the remaining arguments 
in appellant's brief (except for Point III, concerning costs) may 
be disregarded and should not be considered. 
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B. The Trial Court's Findings Of Fact Are Supported By The 
Evidence, 
Standard of Review 
A trial court's finding of fact will only be set aside by a 
reviewing court if it is against the clear weight of the evidence, 
or the reviewing court otherwise reaches a "definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made." Smith, supra, at 1224. 
A finding of fact is clearly erroneous "only if the finding is 
without adequate evidentiary support or is induced by an erroneous 
view of the law." Id. 
Argument 
The evidence supporting the trial court's findings, including 
inconsistencies in the testimony of appellant and his witnesses, can 
only be summarized here. The demeanor and candor of the witnesses 
cannot be addressed. As the Utah Supreme Court once observed, 
It is the duty of this court to leave the 
question of credibility of witnesses to the 
jury or fact trier and we have quite 
consistently adhered to that policy. As has 
often been said, the jury is in a favored 
position to form impressions as to the trust 
to be reposed in witnesses. They have the 
advantage of fairly close personal contact; 
the opportunity to observe appearance and 
general demeanor; and the chance to feel the 
impact of personalities. All of which they 
may consider in connection with the reactions, 
manner of expression, and apparent frankness 
and candor or want of it in reacting to and 
answering questions on both direct and cross-
examination in determining whether, and to 
what extent, witnesses are to be believed. 
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Whereas, the appellate court is handicapped 
by being limited to a review of an impersonal 
record. 
Gittens v. Lundberg. 3 Utah 2d 392, 284 P.2d 1115, 1117 (1955). 
In this case, after a two-day trial to the bench, the trial 
court found that Brighton had not breached any duty to appellant. 
Far from being "without adequate evidentiary support," the court's 
findings were compelled by the substantial evidence adduced during 
the trial. 
This case involves injuries allegedly incurred by appellant, 
Nathan Hale, while he was waiting to load onto the Majestic Ski Lift 
at the Brighton ski resort. Construed in the light most favorable 
to appellee, as it must be,1 the evidence at trial establishes the 
following circumstances of the accident: 
On February 12, 1988, Hale was with his son and his son's 
friends on a church outing, skiing at Brighton. (R.103 at 15.) Hale 
attended the outing to supervise the boys (R.103 at 5) , and had been 
giving instruction to Jerry Steinagel, a 15-year-old boy who had 
never skied before. (R.103 at 119.) Steinagel and another boy, 
Jason Johnstone, were immediately behind Hale in line to board the 
lift. (R.103 at 111.) Instructions on boarding the lift were posted 
at the lift line. (Exhibits 22, 32.) Despite the fact that 
Lamkin v. Lvnch, 600 P.2d 530, 531 (Utah 1979). 
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Steinagel had never skied before, he received no instructions from 
Hale on how to board the lift, (R.103 at 86, 120.) 
As Hale's turn to load approached, he moved forward and stood 
on the "load board" (a device embedded in the snow which marks the 
loading location) in anticipation of loading onto the lift. (R.103 
at 16.) The boys behind Hale were not paying attention and/or 
became confused. Erroneously thinking it was their turn to load, 
the boys proceeded into the loading area prematurely. Both boys 
originally testified that they thought the chair that hit Hale was 
the chair they were supposed to load onto, and therefore they were 
proceeding forward into the loading area: 
A. Okay. Mr. Hale advanced up here and stopped at the 
loading point. And as the chair proceeded around, 
there's a big wheel that the cable runs around. 
Okay, he proceeded around here. Jerry and I just 
had barely come through the gate and we advanced 
a little far. And the ski lift operator — he came 
running. He thought we were going to go too far 
out of the gate, and we didn't go out of the gate. 
He grabbed onto the chair with his left hand 
wait, no, his right hand. 
(Testimony of Jason Johnstone, R. 103 at 95-96.) 
* * * 
Q. (By Mr. Winegar) Jason, let me show you a 
statement that was typed up right here. J. J. is 
Jason Johnstone. Do you recall this statement 
being taken? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. Let me ask you the question that he asked you. He 
asked you: Okay. What happened then, as you 
recall? Is that correct? 
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A. Can you repeat that, please? 
Q. Yes. He said: Okay, What happened then, as you 
recall? 
A. After this right here? 
Q. Can you read what your answer was? 
A. "Okay. Well, I had advanced up into the thing, up 
into the gateway pretty fast, and the instructor, 
you know, the — 
Q. Then he said lift operator? 
A, Okay. 
Q. What did you respond? 
A. " — the lift operator thought I was going a little 
too fast, but I stopped right at the gate — at the 
end of the gate, and he thought I was going to — " 
Then there's a blank, and he said: Slow down. 
. . . 
Q. (By Mr. Winegar) Okay. Then the interviewer said: 
Now, that would be the chair ahead of you. 
And what was your response? 
A. "The one that hit Nathan was going to be our 
chair." 
Q. And he responded, "Okay"; is that correct? 
A. That's what it says. 
(Testimony of Jason Johnstone, R. 103 at 107-08.) 
* * * 
Q. Do you remember being asked similar questions to 
that in your deposition last September? 
A. No, I don't. 
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Q. Okay. That is a narrative, I asked you what you 
said and you made several statements, and then can 
you read your answer on line 2 0 of page 10, and it 
goes on to page 11? 
A. Okay. "To get on the lift, Jason and I — to get 
on the lift Jason and I were standing behind the 
red line that said •stop.1 And Nate was going to 
get on the chair, and we were just going to get on 
the one following right following [sic]. But the 
worker, I guess to be safe, he wanted us to wait 
one in between, to skip one. So we started to 
cross to get onto the following one, I guess. 
"He said, 'Wait a second. ' And he came to guide 
us back across the line. If I remember right, I 
thought he grabbed the chair. He pulled us back 
to stop us. . . ." 
(Testimony of Jerry Steinagel, R. 103 at 121.) 
* * * 
Q. Okay. And then the question, this is the back-
ground question: "And so you were coming out too 
early; is that correct?" And what was your answer? 
A. "Well, the next chair was coming and the next one 
was coming around. We were just going to get up 
there ready to get on the next one, but he wanted 
us not to get on the next one. He wanted us to 
wait one more, the worker did, and so he didn't 
want us to come out right, you know, and wait. He 
just wanted us to stay there. And, of course, it 
was my first time and I probably should have 
waited, but I didn't know, and we just went 
forward. That*s when he brought us back." 
(Testimony of Jerry Steinagel, R. 103 at 124.) 
* * * 
THE WITNESS: "He [The operator] said — okay, he 
didn't say anything. Just, you know, didn't say 
anything until we stuck across the line at the same 
time he was walking back and just said, 'You guys 
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wait. Just wait.1 He said that, 'just wait,1 and 
pushed us back. We said, 'Okay,' and so we just 
backed up." 
(Testimony of Jerry Steinagel, R. 103 at 315.) 
In essence, the boys ran a 'stop sign' and created an 
emergency situation: If they remained there, the lift chair would 
hit them from the side, begin swinging, and then hit Hale also. 
(R.103 at 150, 189-190.) At the time the boys passed the "Wait 
Here" sign, the moving lift chair was so close that it could not be 
stopped without hitting both the boys and Hale: 
Q. Can you tell me what happened when Mr. Hale came 
up? 
A. Sure. He came up to the loading area, just like 
everybody else, and standing in the proper place 
where you are supposed to stand. Everything was 
running smoothly until the two kids that he was, 
I guess, teaching how to ski or something, shot out 
right as the chair was turning. 
Q. They shot out? What do you mean by that? 
A. They just kind of came out. They were not out far. 
They were just out, I don't know, maybe a couple 
of feet or so, just to where the chair would have 
hit them. I could have hit the stop button. The 
chair would have still slammed into them. The only 
way to do it was to get them out of the way. 
Q. Were they in danger of being hit? 
A. They would have been hit. They would have been 
hit. In fact, when I pushed them back, the chair 
grazed the inside kid. 
Q. You physically pushed? 
A. You bet. 
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Q. If I can finish the question, did you physically 
push one or both boys back across the line? 
A. Yes. 
(Testimony of Robert Barton, R. 103 at 150.) 
* * * 
Q. If the chair is coming around this far end of the 
bullwheel here, is there any way, under any 
circumstances, that it can be stopped as to avoid 
a premature skier? 
A. No. 
Q. If the chair is coming around this corner of the 
bullwheel, is there any way under any circumstances 
that it can be stopped to avoid hitting the person 
on the load board? 
A. No. 
(Testimony of Mike Twede, R. 103 at 210.) 
* * * 
Q. If a skier came into the load area early and the 
chair hit the skier, what would be the result to 
the chair? 
A. The skier being an immovable, or semi-immovable 
object, the seat portion of the chair would ride 
up that object, the person, until the person gave 
way or until the chair got high enough it could go 
over the top. 
Q. If the stop button was pushed as the chair came 
around this corner into the B area, is it possible 
to stop the lift before hitting an incoming skier? 
A. Now [sic] the chair would still be in motion. 
Q. And under the best of circumstances with the 
heaviest load, is it still possible? 
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A. The chair would still be in motion. 
(Testimony of Theodore Jorgensen, R. 103 at 266.) 
* * * 
Q. If the operator made the decision to stop under the 
set of circumstances we have described, would the 
chair hit the incoming skier? 
A. Yes, unless they stopped. As long as they are 
coming in, and they have only got that two-foot 
distance, it is going to get them. 
(Testimony of Newell Knight, R. 103 at 294.) 
* * * 
Q. Under the assumptions that I have given you, is 
there any way that the stop button will prevent the 
chair from hitting either the incoming skier or 
skiers or the person on the load mark? 
A. There is not. 
(Testimony of Newell Knight, R. 103 at 297.) 
The lift stops slowly, as required by applicable standards, 
so as not to eject skiers who are already sitting in chairs being 
transported to the top of the hill. (R.103 at 180-181.) 
The trial court found that the boys were negligent in entering 
the load area prematurely and that the situation constituted an 
emergency. (R. 88-89; see Addendum.) The lift operator responded 
to this emergency by pushing the boys out of the path of the chair, 
then hitting the stop button and grabbing the chair in an attempt 
to stabilize its swing. (R.103 at 151-152.) The decision of the 
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operator, which took place in about three quarters of a second 
(R.103 at 286-287), saved the boys from certain impact with the 
chair and potentially serious injury. 
Despite the fact that the operator yelled a warning at the 
boys (R.103 at 104, 152), despite the standard loading procedure 
and express instructions to turn around to see and grasp the 
approaching chair (R.103 at 197, and Exhibits 23, 32), and despite 
the fact that Mr. Hale had turned around to see and grasp the 
approaching chair for all of his skiing life (R.103 at 63), Hale 
stood facing forward and did not see or grab the lift chair as it 
came toward him. The chair struck him on the leg from behind. 
(R.103 at 63.) 
There was some question in the testimony as to whether another 
skier was standing next to Mr. Hale, but it is clear that if a skier 
was there, the skier merely took a step to the side and was missed 
by the chair, or loaded onto the chair without incident by using the 
normal procedures of turning to see and grasp the chair. (R.103 at 
105-06.) Even when a lift chair is swinging, a skier can usually 
board the chair by dampening the swing with an arm, as is the usual 
practice. (R.103 at 197-198.) Loading the chair lift is an easy 
procedure if th€> skiers follow the basic illustrated steps posted 
before the loading area. (See Exhibits 22 and 32.) In fact, the 
process is so simple that in almost 18 years of loading and 
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supervising lifts, Brighton's lift supervisor recalled only 5 or 6 
incidents involving injuries significant enough to be reviewed by 
the ski patrol. (R.103 at 196.) 
The lift chair struck Hale in the back of the left leg near 
the knee and pushed him slowly forward, still standing on his skis. 
(R.103 at 322-323.) Hale was asked by several Brighton personnel 
if he was injured, but stated numerous times that he was okay and 
proceeded into the lodge to rest. (R.103 at 207, 234-235.) Some 
forty-five minutes later, Hale reported to the ski patrol first-aid 
room, where he complained of a pain in his knee. (R.103 at 234-235.) 
Pursuant to the ski patrol's standard practice, Hale was given 
first-aid treatment, including a total body survey in which his 
entire body was physically examined and he was asked if he had pain 
in any other area. (R.103 at 209.) He stated that the only pain he 
felt was in the knee. (R.103 at 238, 241-242.) He declined several 
suggested first-aid treatments for pain in his knee. (R.103 at 244-
245.) 
At trial, Hale testified that he began to have problems with 
his back, hand and fingers, and leg shortly after the accident. 
(R.103 at 23.) Hale had previous injuries to the same areas he now 
complains of, but apparently "forgot" to tell his doctor about these 
injuries when asked. (R.103 at 78-79; Exhibit 12.) 
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The above testimony is not only that most favorable to the 
appellee, but is also that which the trial court found to be true. 
The trial court's findings were in accord with the great weight of 
the evidence, and were further supported by the appellant's own 
inconsistent and contradictory testimony.2 
In his brief, Hale totally ignores the substantial evidence 
which supports the trial court's findings, and cites only a few 
items of testimony which he claims supports his version of the 
accident. The "contrary" evidence cited in appellant's brief does 
not undermine the trial court's conclusion. For example, the issue 
of the ski lift operator's level of experience, which occupies 
several pages of appellant's brief, is completely irrelevant to a 
determination of whether the operator was negligent on this 
particular occasion. A person may perform his duties perfectly his 
first day on the job, or a twenty-year veteran may act negligently. 
For example, shortly after the accident, Hale told Brighton 
first-aid attendants that the incident arose out of the premature 
entry by the boys. (See Exhibit 27.) Throughout the trial, 
however, Hale maintained that the boys did not enter the loading 
area early. Hale also testified originally that he heard the lift 
operator yell a warning to the boys, and that the operator then ran 
behind him. (R. 103 at 60.) At trial, however, Hale did not 
remember the warning, and said the operator ran in front of him. 
(R. 103 at 60-61.) Hale also could not decide whether he was 
"crouched down" after being struck by the chair (R. 103 at 62-63) 
or "knocked out" at the time. (R. 103 at 20, 62-63.) 
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The boys1 testimony at trial that they did not enter the 
loading area prematurely is also insignificant. The boys originally 
testified under oath that they did enter prematurely (R.103 at 106-
07, 121, 126); Hale himself confirmed that fact in an accident 
report filled out shortly after the incident (Exhibit 27) . The lift 
operator also testified that the boys entered the load area early. 
(R.103 at 150.) The trial court simply found this testimony more 
persuasive than the boys' conflicting trial testimony. 
Similarly, it is immaterial whether or not Jason Johnstone 
actually overheard a conversation in which the lift operator 
supposedly was criticized for his actions. No one else heard or 
remembers the alleged conversation. Furthermore, even if such a 
conversation did take place, that fact would be, at best, only some 
evidence of negligence. The trial court heard the evidence and 
correctly concluded that the operator was not negligent. 
Hale's final argument in opposition to the trial court's 
factual findings is a claim that applicable American National 
Standards Institute provisions governing ski lifts were violated, 
which Hale apparently contends constitutes causative negligence as 
a matter of law. While Hale apparently is referring to trial 
Exhibit 9, he has attached to his brief a copy of a document 
recently obtained from the U. S. Forest Service, which "as far as 
[he] know[s]," is identical to Exhibit 9. Appellee has not compared 
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the documents to determine whether the two versions are identical, 
but submits that this Court should review Exhibit 9 itself, if 
necessary, rather than a substitute which may or may not be 
identical to the actual exhibit. 
Contrary to Hale's wishful assertion that it is "quite 
obvious" that the lift operator should have hit the stop button 
before grabbing the chair, the testimony he cite establishes — at 
most — that pushing the stop button first was one option open to 
the operator. 
Additionally, as the trial court found, the operator was 
confronted with an emergency situation, and therefore his conduct 
must be judged accordingly. The operator cannot be found negligent 
for exercising one of two or more reasonable alternatives, even if, 
in hindsight, Mr. Hale believes one is preferable to another. In 
fact, the evidence showed that the boys and Hale would have been 
injured if the operator had pushed the stop button first. The 
actions taken by the operator probably would have resulted in no 
injury to anyone if Hale had simply turned and grasped the pole as 
he should have. 
Moreover, Hale's argument ignores the well-established rule 
that statutory violations may be excused if the actor's conduct is 
reasonable under the circumstances. Jorgensen v. ISSA, 739 P. 2d 
80, 82 (Utah App. 1987). The trial court recognized that fact in 
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this case when he indicated that "the only question . . . in all of 
the rhetoric is whether or not the reaction of the lift operator, 
in doing whatever he did was negligent." (R.103 at 370.) 
Hale challenges the trial court's characterization of the 
circumstances as an emergency by arguing that skiers entering the 
ski lift area prematurely is not a unique circumstance, and in fact 
is one of the hazards for which Brighton's lift operators are 
trained. Hale's argument overlooks the fact that the law does not 
restrict the concept of an emergency to unique situations not 
foreseeable to the actor. Perhaps the best example is in the 
context of automobile accidents. On numerous occasions, the Utah 
Supreme Court and this Court have recognized that a driver may be 
faced with an emergency situation through the fault of another 
driver, yet it cannot be said that such situations are unique, or 
that operators of vehicles are not trained for such incidents and 
cannot foresee them happening at some time. See, e.g., Hillier v. 
Lamborn. 740 P.2d 300, 302-03 (Utah App. 1987), and cases cited 
therein. On the contrary, on a highway, as in a ski lift area, it 
is known that certain circumstances may occur which will create a 
dangerous situation. Merely because that possibility is foreseeable 
does not mean that the actor is not faced with an emergency. 
The trial court heard the evidence for two days, and found 
that Brighton did not breach any duty to Mr. Hale. The isolated 
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portions of testimony cited in Hale's brief certainly do not compel 
the conclusion that the Court's findings were "against the clear 
weight of the evidence," particularly in light of the overwhelming 
evidence supporting the findings. Accordingly, the judgment should 
be affirmed. 
POINT II 
HALE'S CLAIMS ARISE OUT OF AN INHERENT RISK 
OF SKIING, AND ARE BARRED UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 78-27-53. 
Standard of Review 
As an alternative ground for finding no cause of action 
against appellee, the trial court found that Hale's alleged injuries 
were caused by the negligence of other skiers. Consequently, the 
court concluded that Hale's injuries arose out of an inherent risk 
of skiing, as defined by Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-53. 
The trial court's finding of fact may be reversed only if 
clearly erroneous. Smith, supra, at 1224. The trial court's 
interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-53 is a question of law 
which is reviewed for correctness. Western Fiberglass, Inc. v. 
Kirton, McConkie and Bushnell. 789 P.2d 34, 37 (Utah App. 1990). 
Argument 
Because the trial court's finding of no breach of duty plainly 
was not against the weight of the evidence, this Court need not 
consider the alternative grounds for judgment cited by the trial 
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court. In any event, however, the evidence and applicable statutory 
language support the trial court's conclusion that Hale's cause of 
action arose from an inherent risk of skiing, and is barred by Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-27-53. 
Through two separate enactments, the Utah legislature has 
expressly recognized that the sport of skiing has certain risks of 
injury that are inherent to the sport. In 1969, the legislature 
adopted the Passenger Tramway Act, which acknowledged the state 
policy of "protect[ing] its citizens and visitors from unnecessary 
mechanical hazards in the design, construction and operation of 
passenger tramways, but not from the hazards inherent in the sports 
of mountaineering, skiing and hiking, or from the hazards of the 
area served by such passenger tramways, all of which hazards are 
assumed by the skier or other sportsman ..." Utah Code Ann. 63-
11-37. 
In 1979, the legislature further 
clarif[ied] the law in relation to skiing 
injuries and the risk inherent in that sport, 
to establish as a matter of law that certain 
risks are inherent in that sport, and to 
provide that, as a matter of public policy, 
no person engaged in that sport shall recover 
from a ski operator for injuries resulting 
from those inherent risks. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-51. 
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Under the "inherent risks" statute, such risks include, but 
are not limited to, "impact with lift towers and other structures 
and their components; collisions with other skiers; and a skier's 
failure to ski within his own ability." Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-52. 
For proper application of the inherent risks concept in this 
case, it is necessary to examine the language of the tramway act in 
conjunction with the inherent risks statute. In particular, the 
language of the tramway act deserves particular attention as it 
specifically addresses ski lifts. Utah Code Ann. § 63-11-38(5). 
The tramway act specifies that, with respect to passenger 
tramways, the policy of the state is to protect its citizens and 
visitors from "unnecessary mechanical hazards" arising out of the 
usage of a tramway. (Emphasis added.) The act makes clear that the 
state does not intend to protect skiers from the hazards inherent 
in skiing, "or from the hazards of the area served by such passenger 
tramways . . . " (Emphasis added.) Utah Code Ann. 63-11-37. 
The legislature's use of the disjunctive "or" in the tramway 
statute demonstrates that inherent risks of skiing include not only 
those risks found on the ski slopes, but all risks inherent in the 
sport of skiing.3 The only exception to the inherent risk concept 
See also §78-27-52(1) ("'Inherent risks of skiing' means 
those dangers or conditions which are an integral part of the sport 
of skiing . . .") 
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as applied to ski lifts is mechanical hazards arising in their 
usage. Plainly, not every accident involving a ski lift is caused 
by a "mechanical" hazard. For example, Rule 927-50-2H of the Utah 
Passenger Tramway Safety Committee Regulations states that 
"'Passenger Accident1 shall mean an accident resulting in either 
death or injury requiring major medical attention to one or more 
passengers on the tramway, but which did not involve a mechanical, 
structural, or electrical failure or malfunction of the tramway." 
Utah Admin. R. 927-50-2H (1989.) Ski lift accidents not involving 
mechanical hazards may thus constitute inherent risks of skiing. 
To hold otherwise would be to contradict the express purpose and 
language of the passenger tramway statute. 
The fact that appellant's cause of action was couched in terms 
of negligence does not compel a different result. The inherent 
risks statute, § 78-27-53, as amended in 1986, provides: 
"Notwithstanding anything in § 78-27-37 through § 78-27-43 ["Utah's 
comparative fault statutes! to the contrary, no skier shall make any 
claims against, or recover from, any ski area operator for injury 
resulting from any of the inherent risks of skiing." (Emphasis 
added.) The legislature, by reference to comparative negligence, 
obviously envisioned that an inherent risk of skiing could encompass 
allegations of negligence on the part of a ski operator or third 
parties. 
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In Grieb v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, 400 N.W.2d 653, 155 Mich. 
App. 484 (1987), the plaintiff collided with another skier and was 
seriously injured. Michigan has a ski statute similar to that 
enacted in Uteih, barring actions arising out of obvious and 
necessary dangers of the sport. The plaintiff in Grieb attempted 
to circumvent the inherent risk bar by alleging that the ski resort 
was negligent in failing to prevent the skiers involved from "hot 
dogging" in an unsafe manner. The Michigan Court of Appeals upheld 
summary judgment for the ski resort, finding that, as a matter of 
law, the plaintiff's collision with another skier fell within the 
category of inherent risks of the sport of skiing. The fact that 
the collision allegedly was caused by the negligence of the ski 
resort did not take the claim outside of the inherent risks statute. 
Application of that principle to this case demonstrates that 
Hale's suit is barred as arising out of an inherent risk of skiing. 
There was no allegation that the lift was mechanically deficient. 
Hale's injuries were caused by the negligent or reckless conduct of 
other skiers in approaching the lift prematurely, forcing the lift 
operator to take action to try to avoid an accident. Among the 
examples of inherent risks of skiing set forth in § 78-27-53 are 
collisions with other skiers and the failure of a skier to ski 
within his or her own ability. By logical extension, an injury 
caused by other careless conduct of fellow skiers or the injured 
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skier also falls within the category of an inherent risk. 
The Utah legislature enacted § 78-27-53 to protect ski area 
operators such as Brighton from lawsuits arising out of such 
inherent risks. Appellant quotes at length from the legislative 
history of the act, arguing that it is inapplicable because it was 
never intended to prevent claims where " . . . the operator was, in 
fact, negligent ..." (Brief of Appellant at 32.) Appellant also 
maintains that the operator "... has the responsibility to operate 
his ski area in a non-negligent manner," and that the ski area must 
". . . make sure that they don't operate in a negligent manner." 
(Id. at 33). 
Appellant misses the entire impact of the judgment against 
him, however. The court specifically found that the resort was not 
negligent in any way, and that Hale's alleged injuries were caused 
by other skiers' negligence, which is an inherent risk of 
participating in the sport of skiing. Consequently, the court's 
determination that Hale's cause of action is barred by Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-27-53 should be affirmed. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS AWARD OF 
COSTS TO BRIGHTON. 
Standard of Review 
The trial court's award of costs is reviewed on an abuse-of-
discretion standard. Lloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's Way, 753 P. 2d 
507, 510 (Utah App. 1988). 
Argument 
A. Appellant Has Waived Any Objections To Brighton's Memorandum 
of Cost. 
Appellant's so-called "Objection" to Brighton's memorandum of 
costs consisted of a single sentence stating that appellant objected 
to Brighton's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
judgment, and memorandum of costs. (R. 94.) No specific grounds 
were set forth for Hale's objection. Accordingly, under Utah Law, 
Hale failed to preserve any such grounds for appeal. Beehive 
Medical Electronics, Inc. v. Sguare D Co.. 669 P. 2d 859 (Utah 1980); 
Meyers v. Salt Lake City, 747 P.2d 1058 (Utah App. 1987). 
The requirement that only specifically identified grounds for 
objection are preserved for appeal follows logically from the well-
established rule that issues not raised before the trial court are 
not reviewable on appeal. Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938 (Utah 
1987); Utah County v. Brown, 672 P.2d 83 (Utah 1983). In Mascaro, 
supra, the Utah Supreme Court noted that application of the above 
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B. Brighton's Memorandum Of Costs Was Procedurally Sufficient To 
Support An Award Of Costs. 
Hale does not dispute that Brighton timely filed a memorandum 
of costr m p ^rqnes «~h =*•*• *** •• memorandum Wi'i;". pro<'.t?dii r<ii I I) LI<"" r i <:• i c - ' u l 
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(R. 92 ) 
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Utah Supreme Court has stated that for a valid verification, 
1,1) there must be a correct written oath or 
affirmation, ami (2) it must be signed by the 
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affiant in the presence of a notary or other 
person authorized to take oaths, and (3) the 
latter must affix a proper jurat. 
Mickelson v. Craiqco, Inc., 767 P.2d 561, 564 (Utah 1989). 
Utah appellate courts have not considered the effect of 
failure to include a jurat on an otherwise properly verified 
document. The majority of courts, however, hold that the omission 
in itself does not invalidate a sworn document, because the jurat 
is no part of the oath, but is merely evidence 
of the fact that the oath was properly taken 
before the duly authorized officer. 
50 C.J.S. Jurat, p. 705. See, e.g., Yang v. Stafford, 515 N.E.2d 
1157, 1160 (Ind. App. 1987) (construing rule of court and common 
law); American Home Life Insurance Co. v. Heide, 199 Kan. 652, 433 
P.2d 454 (Kan. 1967); Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority v. 
Zitko, 386 S.W.2d 69, 78 (Mo. 1964, en banc), Huff v. Commonwealth, 
194 S.E.2d 690, 692-93 (Va. 1973). That rule recognizes the policy 
that form should not be elevated over substance, particularly when 
appellant cannot show any prejudice. In this case, appellant does 
not dispute that the memorandum of costs was duly sworn. 
Consequently, the memorandum was valid, and costs were properly 
awarded. 
With respect to the specific cost items awarded, this Court 
has noted that cost of depositions may properly be awarded if the 
depositions were reasonably necessary. Lloyd's Unlimited, supra. 
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depositions were properly awarded. 
The deposition of Richard Cummock, whom plaintiff intended I 
ca] 1 as Alii exporl \ i itness wcis U I S M necessary to learn i mi „ Cummock s 
qualifications and anticipated testimony. As * non-par*y. M" 
Cummock could not be required to answer interrogatorios 
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information provided by appellant concerning Mr. Cummock was a 
"supplemental" interrogatory answer submitted approximately two 
weeks before trial, in which Cummock was identified for the first 
time as an expert witness. The answer indicated that Cummock was 
a "mechanical engineer" who would testify that the lift operator 
should have pushed the stop button first. (R. 33-35.) Plainly, 
appellee could not reasonably be expected to go into trial with such 
sparse information. 
The deposition of Dr. Kimball was also necessitated by 
appellant's inadequate discovery responses. In the same 
supplemental interrogatory answers, appellant stated that his future 
medical expenses were unknown, but would be "substantiated by Dr. 
Gordon Kimball." Again, Dr. Kimball could not be required to answer 
interrogatories, and trial was less than two weeks away. Dr. 
Kimball's deposition was essential to enable appellee to adequately 
defend Mr. Hale's damages claims. Additionally, Dr. Kimball's 
deposition was received in lieu of his appearance at trial. (R.103 
at 72.) Accordingly, the costs of Mr. Cummock and Dr. Kimball's 
depositions were properly awarded. 
As a final matter, Brighton concedes that the expert witness 
fee of Newell Knight may not be compensable as a "cost" under 
Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980). However, Brighton 
submits that appellant has waived any objection to the trial court's 
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CONCLUSION 
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Horfbrable James S. S'awaya 
D i s t r i c t Court Judge 
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